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Abstract  The notion of timê (τιμή, normally translated “honour”) is a key 
concept when it comes to thinking about virtues, roles, and duties in ancient 
Greek ethics and society, both in popular and in philosophical terms. This 
discussion concentrates on the work of the fifth-century historian, Herodotus, 
where the idea of timê as the fulfilment of a specific role in society takes on 
particular and interesting inflections. In Herodotus, as in Greek generally, timê 
covers both the esteem that one receives from others and the claim to esteem that 
the individual him- or herself brings to bear in social interaction. Thus timê is 
both “deference” and “demeanour” (to use Goffman’s terminology). As a quality 
of an individual that commands others’ respect, timê also encompasses the roles 
that are bound up with one’s status. Roles and offices express, attract, and 
demand timê, but such demands are normally constrained by reciprocal respect 
for the timê of others. The office of the Persian king, however, appears at first 
sight to involve unconditional claims to recognition respect, powerful drives 
towards appraisal respect (in Darwall’s terminology), and only limited 
acknowledgement of either ethical norms or others claims as potential limitations 
to regal self-assertion. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the values of 
mutual respect that underpin the freedom enjoyed by citizens of Greek poleis are 
also felt by Herodotus to ground claims to freedom and independence on the part 
of those poleis themselves, claims that the historian’s narrative suggests are 
ultimately upheld by the gods and embedded in the structure of the cosmos itself. 
 
Keywords  Herodotus, honour, timê, Persian wars, Xerxes 
1  Timê as Status-Role 
Timê (τιμή, normally translated “honour”) is a key concept when it comes to 
thinking about virtues, roles, and duties in ancient Greek ethics and society, both 
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in popular and in philosophical terms. There are very interesting things to be said, 
for example, about the role of timê in the Homeric poems, in the theory and 
practice of Athenian law and politics, and in Aristotle’s ethical and political 
theories. This discussion, however, will concentrate on the work of the 
fifth-century historian, Herodotus, where the idea of timê as the fulfilment of a 
specific role in society takes on particular and interesting inflections. 
The core meanings of timê centre on the notion of value. Timê is regular Greek 
for value or price.1 In Herodotus, though the value that timê denotes can be 
economic in nature,2 economic value readily shades into other forms.3 The 
value that Darius sets on the capture of Babylon (the verb timân at 3.154.1) is a 
matter of his priorities and prestige as a king and military commander, not just of 
the city’s wealth. Timê’s reference to forms of value that span economic and 
non-economic spheres is highlighted by Darius’ remark to Histiaeus of Miletus 
that “an intelligent and loyal friend is the most valuable (timiôtaton) of all 
possessions.”4 To acknowledge such value is often to recognize something as 
special: accordingly, a night singled out for a particular festival can be said to be 
“honoured” and the Persians are said to “honour” their own birthdays above all 
other days (1.133.1; cf. 3.79.3 for the same idea with therapeuein). In the same 
way, Naucratis’ special privileges as an emporion mean that the city, too, is 
“honoured” (2.179). 
When used of human beings, however, the verb timan refers to the expression 
of esteem or deference, in the sense established by Erving Goffman (Goffman 
1967; cf. Van Wees 1992). The noun timê, too, often refers to deference or 
respect—it is something the individual receives from other people (such as the 
heroic honours, timai, conferred on Timesius at Abdera, 1.168). The same notion 
(of deference or respect) can also be expressed using the word aidôs (3.72.3, 
3.77.1), which also means “shame.” This in itself is an important feature of 
Greek ways of thinking (Cairns 1993, 2011): aidôs is bidirectional—it focuses 
both on the honour of others (respect) and on one’s own honour (shame). This 
means that it is implicated in both what Goffman calls “deference” and in what 
he calls “demeanour” (i.e., how one projects oneself in social interaction). In 
Greek thought, as in Goffman’s theory, social interaction is a matter of the 
interplay between demeanour (how one projects and defends one’s “sacred self”) 
and deference (how one responds to the demeanour and thus to the “sacred self” 
of the other). This is one of the senses in which timê involves duties—duties to 
                                                               
1 E.g., Homeric Hymn to Demeter 132; cf. timêeis of valuable objects, e.g. Iliad 18.475. 
2 The noun at 7.119.2; cf. the verbal form at 5.77.3, adjectival forms at 3.23.3, 3.84.1, 3.160.2, 
7.8δ.1. 
3 E.g. the cream as the “more valuable” part of mares’ milk, in the eyes of the Scythians, 4.2.2. 
4 5.24.3; cf. 8.105.2 on the value that non-Greeks place on eunuchs, on account of their 
trustworthiness. 
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other bearers of timê. 
The same bidirectionality is apparent also in the reference of timê itself. As 
deference or respect, timê informs, by its presence or absence, virtually every 
form of social interaction. Respect and esteem can be won or lost for a wide 
variety of reasons and in a wide range of social contexts. But in ordinary Greek, 
timê denotes not only the esteem that one seeks from others, but also the qualities 
that attract esteem and the claims to which others’ deference should respond. At 
Iliad 9.498, for example, timê is coupled with aretê (excellence; later “virtue”) 
and biê (strength) as qualities in which gods surpass mortals. Just so, in 
Herodotus, when the Spartans at Plataea station the Tegeans next to themselves 
in the line of battle “for the sake of both timê and aretê” (9.28.3), the timê in 
question is both the claim to esteem that the Tegeans have built up over the years 
(in the Spartans’ eyes) and the current acknowledgement of that claim and 
expression of that esteem in conferring the place of honour in the ranks. One’s 
excellences (including one’s status) constitute one’s timê in the sense of a claim 
or entitlement to others’ esteem. The two senses of timê are inextricably linked: 
each implies and impacts upon the other. 
Timê (qua claim to respect) can rest on any attribute that society finds valuable. 
It is not a single value, associated only with a very limited set of admirable 
qualities. It is expected that legitimate claims to honour will be recognized, and a 
proper sense of honour requires the limitation of one’s own claims out of respect 
for those of others (just as Goffman’s model would predict). To dishonour 
another is not necessarily to win honour for oneself, since some ways of 
dishonouring others are illegitimate (designated by pejorative terms such as 
hybris).5 Thus timê involves cooperation as well as competition. It is not the 
prize in a zero-sum game—not just because taking it from another is not 
necessarily to win it for oneself, but also because timê is not a limited good; one 
can increase one’s own prestige without depriving someone else.6 
As a quality of an individual that commands others’ respect, timê also 
encompasses the roles that are bound up with one’s status. The timê that 
Poseidon says was shared equally between each of the three divine 
brothers—Zeus, Hades, and himself—in the Iliad (15.185–93) consists in the 
prerogatives and the freedom of action that each exercises in his specific domain. 
The timê or timai that are allocated by Zeus to the various divinities in Hesiod’s 
Theogony have a similar sense.7 “Prerogative,” “status,” or “office” are regular 
meanings of the term—the timai that were the offices of the Athenian state both 
                                                               
5  See esp. Fisher 1992; Cairns 1996. 
6 See, e.g., Odyssey 1.95. On all these points, see Cairns 2011. 
7 Ηesiod, Theogony 71–74, 112, 203–204, 421–22, 452, 462, 490–91, 881–85, 892–93; cf. 
Herodotus 1.118.2, 2.53.2 (cited below). 
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expressed the esteem in which the individual was held and constituted a claim to 
that esteem:8 these are the timai that (according to Herodotus at 1.59.5) the 
sixth-century tyrant, Pisistratus, left undisturbed.  
This is a sense that (e.g.) Aristotle confirms in the Politics.9 But these timai 
can be widely distributed: Aristotle sees sharing in timai—qua rights and 
privileges and not only qua offices—as the mark of a citizen.10 Citizenship is in 
one sense a role, or set of roles, but it is also a form of status. It is timê of this 
sort that one would lose in Classical Athens if subject to the penalty of 
atimia—not just “dishonour,” but loss of (some or all) of the prerogatives and 
privileges that distinguish citizens from others.11 These privileges, however, also 
entail duties, both to the community and to oneself: atimia as a penalty for 
attempting to exercise political rights having previously worked as a male 
prostitute (Aeschines 1.19, 21) indicates that citizen timê required the 
maintenance of a certain level of self-respect and respect for community 
standards.12 The idea is that someone who would behave like this has de facto 
opted out, i.e., does not really consider himself the equal of his fellow citizens, 
and so shall not be considered as such. In extending timê (in this sense) to all 
members of a group the Athenians took a step, but only a step, along the path 
which would lead to the recognition that all mankind might constitute a group in 
which all members possess a certain level of rights.  
It is this sense of timê as claim to honour, status, prerogative, or office that 
forms the biggest single category of applications of the concept in Herodotus. As 
the oracle to Eetion at 5.92β.2 makes clear (ο τις σε τίει πολύτιτον όντα, “no ὔ ἐ
one honours you though you are much to be honoured”), one can have such timê 
without actually receiving esteem from others—the oracle successfully 
distinguishes between the claim and its recognition, while also implying the 
anomaly inherent in a failure to recognize such a claim. At 6.66.3, when the 
                                                               
8 For timê as “office” at Athens see (e.g.) Plato, Apology 35b1–3.  
9 3.10, 1281a31–32: τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ’ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον 
εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους (for we say that offices are timai, but if the same people are always 
in office the others are necessarily without timê). Cf. timê as the office/dignity of a king in 
Politics 5.10 (1310b36, 1313a13). 
10 Pace Riesbeck 2016, 193, on Politics 3.5, 1278a35–36 (λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης  μετέχων ὁ
τ ν τιμ ν). Cf. Herodotus 4.145.4, where ῶ ῶ timai are the privileges and prerogatives that come 
with membership of the citizen community at Sparta. 
11 E.g. [Aristotle] Athenaion Politeia 22.8, 53.5–6, 63.3, 67.5, Andοcides 1.74, Xenophon, 
Lakedaimonion Politeia 9.6, Demosthenes 9.44; cf. Ιnscriptiones Graecae I3 40. 6–7, 33–34, 
74 (and often in Attic inscriptions). 
12 As would the imposition of atimia for failing to divorce a wife caught in the act of 
consensual, extra-marital sex, if we could be sure that this provision formed part of the 
Athenian law on seduction (moicheia). But the only evidence is the document at [Demosthenes] 
(i.e. Apollodorus) 59.87, on which see Canevaro 2013, 195–96. 
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Pythian priestess, Perialla, is removed from her timê, the primary reference is not 
to the future esteem that she will forfeit, but to the office of which she is 
deprived. 13  The same sense occurs ironically at 7.36.1, in the historian’s 
reference to those who have the “honour without charis” of lashing the 
Hellespont. The term acharis implies that charis (grace, gratitude, reciprocity) is 
normally in play when such an honour is bestowed: it involves a position of trust 
conferred, as a mark of honour (cf. 3.34.1), on an individual deemed capable of 
exercising it and thus deserving of the respect that the position commands; for 
such favour (charis) one would normally feel gratitude (charis) and expect, on 
carrying out the task, the gratitude (charis) of others. Since timê in this sense 
involves the allocation and exercise of prestigious forms of status (what has been 
called a “status-role”),14 it is also used of the powers and prerogatives of gods 
and kings.15 But it can also refer to the prerogatives that come with membership 
of a citizen community (4.145.4, Sparta). 
2  The King and His Subjects 
The existence of these two aspects of timê, both one’s own status-role and others’ 
esteem, points to the embeddedness of the concept in structures of reciprocity, as 
we see in connection with the timê of kings and their subordinates. It is the 
prestigious status of the office of king itself that gives a king the power and 
capacity to confer honour on trusted retainers, often by giving them special roles 
and responsibilities. At 3.34.1 serving as Cambyses’ wine-pourer—“itself no 
small timê”—honours the son in the same way as the role of messenger shows 
how Cambyses “particularly esteemed ( τίμα)” the father. These positions confer ἐ
a prestige that others should also recognize, but fundamentally they express the 
king’s esteem as a reward for loyalty and services rendered, often expressed as a 
matter of the subordinate’s “excellence” (aretê) or being a “good man.”16 At the 
same time, the services themselves that the retainers and benefactors perform 
recognize the king’s claim to deference on the basis of his office.17 The king 
honours his retainers and benefactors and they honour him.  
Honouring one’s benefactors is normal Greek practice (e.g., 7.213.3), but it is, 
Herodotus confirms, a Persian custom too. Zopyrus, a Persian nobleman, 
                                                               
13 Cf. 1.59.5 (cited above), of the magistracies of the archaic Athenian polis; 2. 65. 3, of a 
hereditary Egyptian priesthood. 
14  Beattie 1964, 35–36, followed by Macleod 1982, 138–39. 
15 Gods: 1.118.2, 2.53.2; kings: 1.91.1, 4.155.2, 4.162.1–2, 7.8α.2, 7.104.1; cf. the gerea, 
“privileges,” of Spartan kings at 6.56–58. 
16 See 3.154.1, 3.160.1–2, 4.143, 7.107.1, 7.135, 8.69.1–2, 8.105.2. 
17 See 2.79, 2.172, 3.15, 6.51–52, 6.57. 
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conceives the idea that Babylon is destined soon to fall to the besieging Persians 
and wants to be the one to bring it about, as a means to incurring the king’s 
gratitude, since “among the Persians benefactions are greatly honoured in return, 
in proportion to their magnitude” (3.154.1). To win the trust of the Babylonians, 
he mutilates himself and blames the king, Darius. Then he opens the gates of the 
city to the attacking Persians and wins Darius’ undying esteem (timê) as Persia’s 
greatest benefactor (3.160.1). 
Darius’ gratitude to Syloson, a Greek from Samos, is a paradigmatic instance 
of the same thing: when Darius was just a humble guardsman, he caught sight of 
Syloson on a visit to Egypt and took a fancy to his cloak; though he offered to 
buy it, Syloson gave it to him as a gift (3.139.2−3). After Darius became king, 
Syloson seized his opportunity and reminded Darius of his benefaction: as 
Syloson had given according to his means in the past, so Darius now reciprocates 
in accordance with his new status as king (3.140).  
In the case of Darius’ son and successor the picture is a little different. His 
gratitude towards Boges, governor of Eion in Thrace, follows the pattern of his 
father’s towards Zopyrus (7.107): he “never stopped praising him” and 
“honoured his surviving sons,” because Boges preferred to die in execution of his 
task as governor, sacrificing himself and his entire household, rather than incur 
the charge of cowardice in the king’s eyes by surrendering the city and returning 
to Asia under a truce. Prior to that, however, as the expedition made its way 
through Phrygia, Xerxes and his army were entertained by a rich Lydian called 
Pythius, who offered to devote all his monetary wealth (an immense sum, since 
Pythius was the second-richest man in the world, after Xerxes) to financing the 
expedition. Xerxes would not hear of it, but instead rewarded Pythius with the 
7,000 gold staters he needed to bring his total up to 4 million and made him his 
guest-friend (7.27–29). Emboldened by this, Pythius asks Xerxes for one more 
favour: to spare the eldest of his five sons from participation in the expedition 
(7.38). Xerxes is furious at the impudence (tolma, anaideia) of a “slave” 
(7.39.1–2), but represents his punishment as a form of generosity: just as he 
previously gave a greater reward than he received as benefaction, so now that 
Pythius has disappointed him he returns less harm, by killing “only” the son 
whom Pythius had asked him to excuse.18 He has his men cut the boy in two and 
then marches his army between the two halves, one on either side of the road 
                                                               
18 Though Xerxes’ response is almost certainly to be regarded as extreme, his justification 
may indicate the force of the Persian norms cited by Herodotus in 1.137.1, that not even the 
king can execute a person for a single crime or a master impose any “irremediable” 
punishment on a slave for a single offence. Only after calculation (logismos) that the slave’s 
adikêmata outweigh his services can the master express his anger (thymos). 
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(7.39.2).19 The norms of reciprocity here are familiar (from a wide range of 
societies), but complicated to discuss in detail. Suffice it to say that Xerxes’ 
behaviour recognizes that there are such norms, yet emphasizes the extent to 
which someone like him is able, with impunity, to pervert them. 
This travesty of the norms of reciprocity demonstrates the inevitable 
asymmetry between king and benefactor in such relationships—the benefactor 
may become the king’s guest-friend, but nonetheless remains his slave. This 
asymmetry between king and subject is vividly and concretely demonstrated in 
the requirement that the subject express deference through proskynêsis 
(prostrating oneself before a superior).20 It is also brought out in a dialogue at 
7.135 between the Persian general, Hydarnes, and two Spartan noblemen who are 
on their way to Susa to atone for the Spartans’ earlier murder of Darius’ heralds. 
Hydarnes asks them why the Spartans refuse to become the Persian king’s 
“friends” (philoi), using himself as an example of the king’s readiness to reward 
benefactors (“to honour good men,” 7.135.2). But the Spartans point to the 
inequality of this “friendship”: the deference required to elicit the king’s esteem 
means exchanging freedom for slavery (the condition of all Persians, even 
Hydarnes, according to them, 7.135.3). A king can resent and punish a subject’s 
lack of deference; the subject may hope that the king will reciprocate, but there is 
little one can do if he does not. What the king demands is what Stephen Darwall 
(1977) has called “recognition respect,” respect for his status as such. 
Recognition respect can respond to roles and offices (as in this case), but might, 
in other circumstances, respond to any form of status felt to demand recognition 
—including that of human being as such. In the king’s case, however, such 
respect is a matter of prudent calculation—it carries no implications about the 
king’s performance qua king or indeed about his behaviour as a human being or 
moral agent. This role is not awarded on the basis of virtue. The esteem that the 
king shows those of his subjects who demonstrate outstanding loyalty or 
devotion, on the other hand, is “appraisal respect” for an individual’s merits.21 
With regard to his subjects, whether they are Persians or members of other 
nations and communities, the Persian king (as represented by Herodotus) is 
relatively free of any need to accord recognition respect. Though the role of king 
entails duties, and these duties may (in some sense) be related to certain virtues 
or excellences on the king’s part (see below), others’ obligations to the king far 
                                                               
19 The killing or mutilation of the son(s) as a means of retribution against the father is a 
recurrent motif in some of the more horrific of Herodotus’ tales (e.g. 1.117–19, 3.11, 3.35, 
3.126.2, 4.84, 7.38–39, 8.106.4; cf. Fisher 2002, 206). 
20 E.g., 3.86.2, 7.13.3, 7.136.1. 
21 Let me note here in passing (a) that I think that Darwall’s two kinds of respect often 
co-exist, feed into each other, and overlap and (b) that I am not arguing that the ancient Greeks 
(or ancient Greek) operated with an explicit distinction of that sort. 
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outweigh his obligations to others, such as they are. Being a subject of the king is 
to be—at least from a Greek rhetorical perspective—his “slave,” as we saw 
above on 7.39.1 (Pythius) and 7.135.3 (the Spartans).22 The effect of this 
rhetoric is to deny the king’s subjects the kind of status that would command 
recognition respect. And this emerges as one of the key differences between life 
in the paradigmatic Greek polis and life under the Persian Empire as the 
Histories move towards their conclusion: members of Greek communities freely 
choose their courses of action, by contrast with the obedience of the king’s 
subjects, which has to be coerced. The locus classicus is perhaps the dialogue 
between Xerxes and the deposed Spartan king, Demaratus, at 7.101–4: what will 
make the Spartans resist the “slavery” that Xerxes seeks to impose on them is the 
fact that, though free, they subject themselves to the law; their fear of the law is 
greater than the fear that Xerxes inspires in his subjects, despite Xerxes’ belief 
that only the latter is capable of making men fight. Even if conduct in battle was 
governed by law—in some sense of the word—at Sparta (MacDowell 1986, 
42–46), Demaratus’ statement also covers the social attitudes (also nomoi) so 
much in evidence elsewhere. The Spartans’ fear of the law is not just fear of 
punishment, or even of disgrace, but respect for a set of values to which Spartans 
as a community are committed. 
Internally, then, Greek communities are different from the Persian 
empire—claims to respect in such communities always have to be balanced by 
recognition of similar claims on the part of other members of the community and 
failure to recognize such claims is liable to sanction, including the sanction of 
others’ disesteem. Part of what makes the difference, in this respect, is what the 
Corinthian Socleas at 5.92α.1 calls isokratia, the comparative equality between 
citizens that is characteristic of most Greek forms of political organization (with 
the exception of tyranny).23  But this, as Demaratus emphasizes, is also a 
distinction between Greeks and Persians in terms of international relations. The 
freedom enjoyed by citizens in Greek states (when not subjected to tyranny, at 
least) is, in both authorial voice and character-speech, linked to the freedom and 
independence of Greek states.24 If the role of the Persian king is (comparatively) 
                                                               
22 Cf. 7.8β.3, 7.96.2, 8.68γ, 8.102.2–3, 8.116; also the relationship between Egyptians and 
their Pharaoh, 2.172.5, the subjects of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela in Sicily, 7.154.2. See 
further Serghidou 2004. 
23 Cf. Herodotus himself at 5.78 on Athenian isêgoria (equality of speech). 
24 See 5.78 (authorial voice), 5.92 (character-speech), 6.109.3 (ditto), 7.135.3 (cited above: 
character speech), 7.147.1 (indirect discourse), 8.140–44 (character-speech). NB the telling 
authorial aside, at 9.19.1, that those Peloponnesian cities that opted in the end to resist Persian 
domination and not to betray Greece were “those who were persuaded by the better course,” 
το σι τ  μείνω άνδανε. Cf. e.g. the authorial condemnation of Medism at 8.73.3. On the ῖ ὰ ἀ ἑ
Persians’ subject peoples as “slaves” and on Greek resistance, see further below. 
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unconstrained by the need to respect his own subjects, is it, perhaps, constrained 
by the need to respect the timê of free peoples? If it is, what is the sanction for 
ignoring such constraints? 
3  The King’s Timê and Its Limits 
Timê is central to the motivation of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece.25 For Xerxes, as 
in general, the position of king is itself a timê: “When I took the throne,” he says, 
“I began to consider how to avoid falling short of those who preceded me in this 
timê”—“becoming king” and “being in this timê” are synonymous (7.8α.2). But 
since his predecessors in the role increased the empire, the onus is on Xerxes to 
pursue further glory (kydos), while at the same time recovering the timê lost 
when his father, Darius, was defeated by the Athenians at Marathon, obtaining 
redress (timôria, tisis) from those who took the initiative in unjust aggression 
(7.8α.2−β.3).26 Xerxes’ motives are partly expansionist, both in material terms 
(7.8α.2)27 and in terms of timê; thus there is a sense in which his timê, his role as 
king, also entails the need to demonstrate certain kinds of excellence—Xerxes 
wants the recognition respect due the king of Persia and the appraisal respect that 
would mark him as a worthy incumbent of that role. But at the same time as he 
acknowledges the desire to enhance his esteem, he also justifies the enterprise on 
which he wishes to engage by representing it as a legitimate response to 
gratuitous harm,28 a typical move in the rhetoric of Herodotean belligerents,29 
but also a key issue for the historian himself, as we see in his search for the 
original act of unprovoked aggression (“unjust deeds,” 1.5.3) behind the enmity 
of Greek and barbarian (1.1–5). The issue of “who started it” is, in Greek and 
Herodotean terms, about right and wrong, justice and injustice.30 Thus Xerxes’ 
                                                               
25 On Xerxes’ motives, in the context of a general overview of Herodotean motivation, see 
Froehlich 2013, 135–48. 
26 Cf. (his general) Mardonius’ initial arguments at 7.5.2–3, Xerxes’ furious response to 
Artabanus’ opposition to the expedition at 7.11, and Xerxes’ speech to his council at 7.53.1. 
27 Cf. 7.8γ, Mardonius at 7.5.3; Fisher 2002, 220. Cf. also Darius at 6.94.1. 
28 Cf. Mardonius at 7.5.3 and 7.9.2, Xerxes himself again at 7.11.2–4. Darius similarly wanted 
tisis against the Athenians for their part in the Ionian revolt (5.105.2, cf. 6.94.1, 6.101.3), just 
as he was then incensed by the defeat at Marathon (7.1.1), but he did not live to obtain timôria 
(7.4.1). 
29 Cf. (at least) 2.152.3, 3.49.2, 3.127.3, 4.1.1, 4.4.1, 4.119.2–4, 4.139.3, 5.74.1, 6.84.2, 6.87, 
with Gould 1989, 63–64, 82–85. 
30 See (e.g.) the differing Athenian and Pelasgian versions of the latter’s expulsion from Attica 
at 6. 137.1–138.1. Both tisis and timôria in Herodotus are regularly presented as reactions to 
injustice (adikia: 1.4.1, 2.115.3–4, 2.120.5, 5.56.1, 7.9.2, 8.105.1). While adikia in Greek can 
refer to purely interpersonal wrongs, it also covers acknowledged breach of widely accepted 
norms, and in fact all Herodotean instances of its association with tisis and timôria fall into 
this category (cf. “pay the penalty (dikê),” 3.69.2 = tisis, 3.75.3). 
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concern for timê (again, as Herodotus here represents it) is to some degree 
ethically responsive: to justify the pursuit and exercise of timê as the return of 
harm for harm is in theory to recognize that pursuing or exercising timê by 
initiating harm would be unjustified.31 To that extent, Xerxes’ focus on his timê 
as king (both as status-role and as others’ esteem) is conditioned by ethical 
considerations. But such considerations tend to loom larger when one sees 
oneself, genuinely or otherwise, as the victim.  
In Xerxes’ case, as in that of his father (3.134.2), the determination to retaliate 
combines the moralistic desire to punish (allegedly) unprovoked aggression with 
a concern to demonstrate one’s manliness, to wipe out any suggestion of 
weakness or cowardice (7.11.1).32 This, too, is a concern for timê: in the 
complex of Greek values that are here being attributed to Xerxes and the Persians, 
anger, indignation, and the determination to seek redress for injustice span a wide 
spectrum from personal to moral offence. The moralizing arguments that Xerxes 
presents for seeking tisis and timôria against the Athenians and others are not 
necessarily specious or self-serving, but they do belong with a sensitivity to 
insult that often approaches the pathological (e.g., 7.38–39, 7.238, 9.111). 
Xerxes, qua king of Persia, thus (a) demands and is used to receiving 
recognition respect for his status-role as king; (b) sees his role as entailing the 
demonstration of certain forms of prowess and achievement; (c) wishes to 
enhance his status as king through appraisal respect or esteem for such 
achievement; and (d) is determined to avoid any charge of personal inadequacy 
not only in his role as king but qua man of honour. He recognizes the norm that 
the benefactions he receives from his subjects should be reciprocated, but 
regularly behaves in ways which reveal the asymmetry of the relationship and the 
weakness of the normative constraints that it provides in his own case. Equally, 
he recognizes, at least to some extent, that relations between states can involve 
the same sort of interplay of claims to respect and honour as exists between 
                                                               
31 Herodotean speakers do occasionally recognize in so many words that these norms also 
apply to their own conduct (rather than that of their opponents): see 4.119.2–4, 6.92.2. 
32 At 3.134.2 Darius’ wife, Atossa, urges him to attack Greece not only to enhance Persian 
power but also to prove that he is a real man; just so at 7.11.1, Xerxes construes Artabanus’ 
caution as cowardice which condemns him to stay behind among the women. The parallel 
between Xerxes’ motivation and his father’s in this respect is only one of many between their 
two expeditions: e.g. Atossa’s encouragement at 3.134.2 is followed at 3.134.4 by Darius’ 
revelation of his decision to build a bridge between two continents; Darius, too, is opposed by 
Artabanus (4.83.1), whose good advice is disregarded (4.83.2; Artabanus himself draws the 
parallel at 7.10α.2). This is followed in 4.84 by Oeobazus’ request that one son be spared 
military service (with Darius’ response that all would be and the killing of all three; cf. Xerxes 
and Pythius, 7.39). Similarly, each expedition is prefaced by a profusion of statistics 
(4.86/7.60–99, 7.186; cf. 8.43–48, 9.30–32), the momentous step of crossing into Europe is 
emphasized (4. 89/7.55–56), etc.  
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individuals, yet his own status and power as king among the Persians lead him to 
equate Persian timê with his own, qua king and qua man. His concern for his 
own timê is both considerable and largely unbalanced by respect for the timê of 
other individuals or communities. 
Part of the rhetoric in which Xerxes’ conduct in general and his expedition in 
particular is couched, both by Greeks and by Persians (including Xerxes himself), 
turns on the fact that the position, status, and power of the Persian king lead him 
to regard not only individuals (cf. above) but also communities, subject or 
otherwise, as actual or potential slaves. This means that the claims to recognition 
respect of other states loom no larger in his calculations than those of his own 
individual subjects. In Mardonius’ commendation of Xerxes’ proposal to invade 
Greece, this emerges as Persian policy: it would be a terrible thing not to extract 
timôria from the Athenians and others for unprovoked aggression and “mockery” 
when the Persians have reduced so many nations who did them no wrong to 
slavery, merely in order to increase their power (7.9.2).33 Here, the legitimacy of 
retaliation serves not to distinguish justified from unjustified military action, but 
merely as an a fortiori argument—if Persian imperialism aims to enslave nations 
who have done the Persians no wrong, it is all the more pressing that the Persians 
should enslave those who have done them wrong.34 The need to resist this 
Persian aim, in turn, is regularly highlighted in speeches in favour of Greek 
resistance.35  
To the Persians, their subjects are slaves (at least as Herodotus presents it), as 
are, at least potentially, Greek poleis or Scythian tribes, as well as their citizens 
or members. But if Persian subjects have no appeal to any source of normative 
constraint, representatives of Greek poleis do appeal to norms; for them, freedom 
is not just a fact, but a right, a status to which they have legitimate title—a claim 
to recognition respect. Free citizens of independent Greek poleis resist Xerxes’ 
                                                               
33 Mardonius has already been shown to be motivated at least as much by personal ambition 
(7.6.1, for the office—i.e., the timê—of governor of Greece) as by the timê of king and country 
(7.5.2) and the expansion of the Persian empire (7.5.3). 
34 Cf. Xerxes at 7.8γ.3. For the status of Persian subject peoples as “slaves,” cf. 1.89.1, 1.94.7, 
1.95.2, 1.120.5, 1.129.3, 1.164.2, 1.169.1–2, 1.174.1, 2.1.2, 3.19.3, 3.21.2, 3.88.1, 4.93, 
4.128.1, 5.49.2–3, 5.109.2–3, 5.116.1, 6.11.2, 6.12.3, 6.22.1, 6.44.1, 6.45.6, 6.106.2, 6.109.3, 
7.1.3, 7.7, 7.8γ.3, 7.19.1, 7.51.2, 7.96.2, 7.102, 7.108.1, 7.147.1, 7.168.1, 7.235.3, 8.22.1, 
8.100.5, 8.101.3, 8.142.3, 8.144.1, 9.45.2, 9.48.1, 9.60.1, 9.90.2. Cf. 1.27.5 on Lydian rule 
under Croesus, 4.20.1, relations between Scythian tribes, 4.118.4, the subjugation of Persia to 
the Scythians, and 9.122.4 (the work’s last sentence) the Persians’ own choice of domination 
over “slavery.” 
35 See in primis 7.135.3 (cited above), 7.139.5–6 (with implicit authorial endorsement), 
8.144.2–3, 9.45.1−2, 9.98.3. Cf. Demaratus’ analysis at 7.102 (cited above) and 6.109.3 (on the 
earlier invasion by Darius); on freedom versus slavery as motivating forces, cf. Froehlich 2013, 
93–96. 
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denial of that claim. But they also castigate that denial as normatively 
unwarranted. The success of their resistance in a sense validates the claim, but 
this is not just a matter of the pragmatics of conflict—part of the Greeks’ success, 
Herodotus suggests, derives from the legitimacy of their claim to respect. 
Within a Greek polis (such as Athens), regulated by laws and open political 
and legal processes in which all or many citizens can participate, excessive 
pursuit of esteem, to the extent that it infringes others’ rights to respect, is subject 
to a range of legal and moral norms. Hybris, for example, which signifies just 
that phenomenon,36 is not only socially unacceptable but, at least at Athens, 
prohibited by law.37 In both cases, the norms involved assume a community with 
the power to judge and to sanction. Given the limited success the modern world 
has had in setting up structures which would exercise these functions with regard 
to nation states, one might expect even less purchase for such mechanisms in 
Herodotus’ world. But Herodotus himself is more optimistic. 
Signs of hybris proliferate from the very inception of Xerxes’ plan to invade 
Greece: he intends to yoke the Hellespont (7.8β.1), and cherishes an image of the 
Persian empire encompassing all the lands on which the sun shines, equalling 
“Zeus’ heaven” in extent (7.8γ.1–2).38 So Xerxes believes that his status is 
sufficient to consider subduing the elements themselves and dreams of making 
his dominion co-extensive with the sovereignty of the greatest god of all. God, he 
believes, is guiding Persian destiny for the best, and the Persians themselves have 
merely to follow (7.8α.1). This is a set of attitudes that disconcerts his uncle and 
“wise adviser,”39 Artabanus. He points out that confidence does not always 
precede success, as in the case of Darius’ expedition against the Scythians 
(7.10α), and gives good grounds for caution in undertaking any enterprise against 
the Greeks, making particular reference to the (apparently pragmatic) dangers of 
bridging great waterways (7.10α–δ). He then offers a general, theological 
warning against over-confidence (10δ): “the god” blasts those creatures which 
stand out, and does not allow them to “show off” (phantazesthai), but is not 
irritated by the insignificant; the same applies to houses and trees, for the god is 
wont to cut back all things that stand out. Thus a great army can be destroyed by 
a small, because the god allows no one but himself to think big (10ε).  
Artabanus rephrases his reservations in two subsequent passages. At 7.16α he 
describes his initial opposition focusing on a proposal which “increased hybris” 
and involved “always seeking to have something more than what is present.” 
                                                               
36 Cf. n.5 above. 
37 There was clearly such a law, but the purported text of it given at Demosthenes 21.47 is 
most likely a later concoction: see Canevaro 2013, 224–31. 
38 De Jong 2018, 32–33 notes similarly hybristic overtones in the way that Xerxes later looks 
down, like a god, on the progress of the battles of Thermopylae (7.212.1) and Salamis (8.90.4; 
cf. Aeschylus, Persians 466–67). 
39 A typical figure in Herodotus: see Bischoff 1932. 
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Even when convinced that the expedition must go ahead, Artabanus continues to 
reiterate his earlier position, referring (with examples) to the failure of the strong 
to overcome the weak, stressing Xerxes’ youth, and contrasting the dangers of 
“desiring many things” with the virtues of “keeping quiet” (7.18.2–3). These 
passages, I have argued before, represent variants on a single evaluation of 
Xerxes’ proposed expedition. Ignoring natural boundaries,40  “showing off,” 
“thinking big,” and hybris are all ways of referring to the same general kind of 
conduct.41 
The reference to Xerxes’ expedition as hybris characterizes it as involving 
forms of excess and over-confidence that violate others’ claims to respect; 
references to the kind of thinking big that excites the indignation42 of the gods, 
however, invoke agents with the power to sanction such excess and 
over-confidence; while the reference to excessive size and growth or to natural 
limits project the equilibrium that exists within a society (especially a Greek 
society) between self-esteem and respect for others on to the environment and the 
natural world. These last two points go hand in hand. 
Artabanus’ warnings are amply echoed and finally fulfilled in the narrative of 
Xerxes’ campaigns. The divine hand is clearly at work in the dreams which 
appear to both Xerxes and Artabanus and convince them that the expedition must 
go ahead (7.12–19). The first bridge over the Hellespont is destroyed by a sudden 
and violent storm (7.34), whereupon Xerxes assigns his men the “thankless timê” 
(7.36.1) of lashing the strait and reducing it, symbolically, to slavery (7.35.1), 
adding verbal insults that the author describes as “unGreek and outrageous” 
(βάρβαρά τε κα  τάσθαλα, 7.35.2).ὶ ἀ 43 The battle of Salamis is preceded by 
                                                               
40 See Gould 1989, 100–109, and cf. Hartog 1988, 331 and (on the Scythian campaign as a 
prefiguration of Xerxes’ invasion) 34–40. On the “river motif,” cf. Immerwahr 1966, 75, 84, 
91–92, 130, 132, 166, 183 n. 103, 293, 316; Fisher 1992, 352–58, 377, 383. In general, see 
Lloyd-Jones 1983, 60–69. 
41 So Cairns 1996, arguing against Fisher 1992, 367–74, 384. Cf. Dickie 1984, 104–06. 
42 Phthonos, begrudgery; this can be top-down (jealousy, as when a god begrudges the 
implication that a human being might come anywhere near a god in terms of good fortune or 
success) or bottom-up (envy, as when one human being begrudges another’s possession of 
some desired good). See Cairns 2003. 
43 On the account of the bridging of the Hellespont, see Fisher 1992, 377–78, recognizing that 
the use of atasthala identifies conduct which might also described as hybris. As Dr David 
Lewis points out to me, the 300 lashes that Xerxes orders (7.35.1) exceed the 50 lashes that are 
apparently standard as punishment for slaves at Athens (Aeschines 1.139; Nikophon’s law on 
coinage (Stroud 1974), lines 30–32; Inscriptiones Graecae ii2 1362 lines 9–10; Inscriptiones 
Graecae ii2 380 lines 4–2; Inscriptiones Graecae ii2 333 lines 6–7; convincingly restored at 
Inscriptiones Graecae ii2 1013 line 5) and elsewhere (Delos: Supplementum Epigraphicum 
Graecum 23:498 = Lois sacrées des cités grecques Suppl. 53; Pergamum: Supplementum 
Epigraphicum Graecum 13: 521), and even the 100 lashes specified in Inscriptiones Graecae 
IX 1109 = Lois sacrées des cités grecques 84 (Thessaly) and in P.Lille I.29 col. 2 lines 25–36 
(Ptolemaic Egypt). 
Douglas Cairns 88
Herodotus’ endorsement of the truth of an oracle (an indication of the validity of 
oracles in general) which had predicted divine retribution for the Persians’ hybris 
(8.77)44 and followed by Themistocles’ evaluation of the reasons for Xerxes’ 
defeat (8.109.3): Greek victory, he says, was not achieved by merely mortal 
means, but the gods and heroes grudged ( φθόνησαν) one manἐ —an impious and 
wanton (atasthalos) man, a man who committed gross acts of sacrilege, who 
actually lashed and bound the sea—rule over Asia and Europe.45 Other signs of 
divine involvement, including the representation of natural disasters and similar 
phenomena as consequences of the violation of natural limits, abound in the 
historian’s account.46  
It cannot be said that the Persians or even Xerxes himself are wholly oblivious 
to the limitations that beliefs of these kinds impose on the pursuit of honour: 
Xerxes is, after all, initially warned of these limitations, both as divinely imposed 
and as inherent in the natural order, by a fellow Persian, Artabanus. The Histories 
end with a reference to a warning given long ago by Cyrus the Great, to the effect 
that the growth of wealth and power inevitably leads to decadence, decline, and 
becoming the “slaves” of others (9.122).47  Xerxes himself is momentarily 
touched by the brevity of human life and the vulnerability of all human 
                                                               
44 See Cairns 1996, 15 and n. 62, and contrast Fisher 1992, 375–76. 
45 Themistocles is being disingenuous here (as Herodotus represents it, 8.109.5–110), but his 
words (a) persuade his audience and (b) chime with others’ evaluations and with the shape and 
content of the narrative, especially Herodotus’ own praise of the Athenians as those whose 
commitment to freedom, with the help of the gods, saved Greece (7.139.5–6).  
46 E.g. omens, miracles, and other signs (sun disappears, 7.37.2; divine weapons appear before 
the temple of Apollo at Delphi, 8.37.1, vouched for by Herodotus himself at 8.37.2; even more 
amazing signs—a thunderbolt, a landslide, a shout from the temple, 8.37.3; Dicaeus and 
Demaratus hear a divine voice (portending Persian defeat) from Eleusis, 8.65.2; a cloud settles 
on Salamis, indicating that Xerxes’ fleet is destined to be destroyed, 8.65.6, because the 
expedition’s fate is the gods’ concern, περ  δ  στρατι ς τ σδε θεο σι μελήσει, 8.65.5; bad ὶ ὲ ῆ ῆ ῖ
omens, prayer, good omens before Plataea, 9.61.3–62.1; somehow Greeks at Mycale get word 
(on same day) that Mardonius has been defeated at Plataea that very day; a herald’s wand is 
found on the beach, 9.100.1, confirming divine involvement, in Hdt.’s view, 100.2; storms 
(7.188–91, including a reference at 7.189 to Boreas, the god of the north wind, as the 
Athenians’ son-in-law; 8.12.1, divinely caused, the historian suggests, to reduce the Persian 
fleet to roughly the same size as the Greek; 8.129.3, flood tide caused by desecration of a 
temple of Poseidon, in an explanation endorsed by the historian himself); oracles (8.53.1, 8.77); 
epiphanies (8.38–39.1). Cf. Herodotus’ suggestion (9.65.2) that no Persian entered or died in a 
precinct of Demeter near Plataeia because the goddess herself refused them entry, having 
burned her temple at Eleusis; also Artabanus on how the land itself becomes Xerxes’ enemy at 
7.49.4. On the natural world and the divine in Herodotus, see now Clarke 2018 and Cozzo 
2018; cf. Romm 2006 and Scullion 2006, 193–95 (though both of these play down the extent 
to which natural phenomena are moralized). 
47 A pattern programmatically affirmed by Herodotus himself at 1.5 and reaffirmed throughout 
his work; see Saïd 2002, 124–37; Griffin 2006, 53; Hau 2016, 181–92. 
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endeavour (7.45)48 and may even experience a moment of compunction at the 
burning of a sanctuary on the Athenian acropolis (as the historian speculates at 
8.54).49 Thus it is not quite the case that Herodotus’ narrative forces the Persians, 
as it were, to play the game by Greek rules by which they inevitably fall short 
(see further Keim 2018). Generally, however, Xerxes’ fixation on his own timê 
regularly leads him to violate even Persian norms on the respect due to others: 
only extreme fury (thymos) could have led Xerxes to mutilate the body of 
Leonidas after Thermopylae, Herodotus concludes, given that the Persians 
normally honour opponents who have proved themselves in warfare more highly 
than any other nation (7.238.2). 
Just as there are norms that stigmatize the excessive pursuit of honour as 
dishonourable, so there are honour-based standards that restrict the pursuit of 
redress for dishonour that one perceives oneself to have suffered. As we saw 
above, Xerxes was partly motivated by the desire to impose tisis and timôria for 
what he represented as unprovoked (and therefore unjust) aggression (7.8α.2). 
But the pursuit of timôria and tisis can be excessive (Fisher 2002, 212–17): when 
an Aeginetan, Lampon, suggests that Pausanias magnify his victory at Plataea by 
treating the dead Mardonius as he and Xerxes had treated the corpse of Leonidas 
after Thermopylae, the historian himself calls this kind of timôria (9.78.3) “most 
unholy” (9.78.1), while Pausanias sees it as typical of barbarians rather than 
Greeks (9.79.1), something that goes beyond appropriate restoration of timê 
(9.79.2).50 What counts as the restoration of timê is conditioned by standards of 
limit and appropriateness that are themselves matters of honour.  
As Herodotus’ use of the term “most unholy” suggests, however, these are 
standards that are policed by the gods. Another example of excessive timôria is 
that pursued by Pheretime for the deposition and killing of her son, Arcesilaus of 
Cyrene. Pheretime eventually impales her son’s killers on the walls of their city 
and has their wives’ breasts cut off to be similarly displayed (4.202.1). But her 
life does not end well (4.205): having secured tisis from the Barcans she dies a 
horrible death, consumed by worms which erupt from her body, as a sign that (as 
                                                               
48 When Xerxes counts himself happy, but then weeps ( νθα τα  Ξέρξης ωυτ ν μακάρισε, ἐ ῦ ὁ ἑ ὸ ἐ
μετ  δ  το το δάκρυσε) a dirὰ ὲ ῦ ἐ ect link is made to the programmatic remarks of the Athenian 
statesman, Solon, on the mutability of fortune at 1.32. For any readers who might be slow on 
the uptake, Artabanus makes the link even clearer at 7.46.2–3; cf. his contributions at 7.10δ.2, 
7.49.3, 7.51.3. The same lesson is imparted by the message of the allied Greek forces to the 
Phocians at 7.203.2 (that no mortal life escapes misfortune and that it is the mightiest who 
experience the greatest reversals). 
49 Cf. the Persian Artayctes’ interpretation of an omen as a sign of (deserved) punishment by 
the hero, Protesilaus, 9.120.2-3. 
50 Leonidas died as a leader of an army, and his honour and that of those who died with him 
are satisfied by the countless Persian deaths at Plataea (9.79.2, recapitulating a judgement 
made by Herodotus himself, using the term dikê, justice, at 9.64.1). 
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the historian puts it) “excessive timôriai are subject to divine resentment.”51 
This case exemplifies a pattern in which tisis and timôria on the mortal level 
are set against wider patterns of cosmic or divine tisis or timôria. Like Pheretime, 
figures such as Oroetes, Leotychidas, and Cleomenes are themselves motivated 
by revenge for what they perceive to be slights, but all meet tisis of a different 
sort when their deaths are presented (by the narrator) as due recompense for what 
they have done to others. The cases of the Spartan kings, Leotychidas and 
Cleomenes, resemble that of Pheretime in that it is simply their untimely and 
ignoble ends that prompt the explicit judgement that they are paying for a 
previous offence.52 Darius brings about Oroetes’ end as tisis for his adikêmata 
(3.127.1), especially the “unbearable hybris” of his murder of Mitrobates and his 
son (3.127.3); but Herodotus adds the further conclusion that this is, at the same 
time, a form of tisis that does not figure in Darius’ motivation at all, for Oroetes’ 
brutal murder of Polycrates and crucifixion of his corpse (3.125.3, 3.126.1, 
3.128.5). In a further variation, the victim of the original offence can carry out 
what seems to be a divinely endorsed form of tisis, as when the eunuch, 
Hermotimus, forces the man who castrated him, Panionius, to castrate his four 
sons, and the sons to castrate him (8.106.4). Herodotus calls this “the greatest 
tisis for adikia” of which he has ever heard (8.105.1), while Hermotimus himself 
affirms that unholy deeds, such as the gratuitous harm that Panionius did him, do 
not escape the gods’ attention, so that, in defence of their own just laws, they 
have now delivered Panionius to him for retribution (dikê, 8.106.3). When 
Herodotus concludes that “both tisis and Hermotimus” overtook Panionius 
(8.106.4) we see that Hermotimus’ personal vengeance and tisis are not quite the 
same thing (Harrison 2000, 105).  
In the same way, the destruction of Troy by the Greeks who came to the aid of 
Menelaus is said in the narrative to be divine timôria for a great adikêma at 
2.120.5.53 Thus the view attributed to the figure who appears in a dream to the 
Athenian tyrant, Hipparchus—that “every unjust man will pay back tisis” (5.56.1) 
—is widely confirmed by Herodotus’ narrative (Gould 1989, 67–76; Lateiner 
1989, 140–44; Harrison 2000, 102–21; Munson 2001, 183–94). This is 
established right at the outset. Gyges’ accession to the throne of Lydia both fulfils 
the destiny of his predecessor, Candaules (“bound to come to a bad end,” 
1.8.2—a recurrent phrase) and satisfies the desire for tisis of the wife that 
Candaules shamed by arranging for Gyges to see her naked (1.10.2); but it is also 
                                                               
51 Cf. divine timôria for an unjust judicial verdict (itself a form of timôria) at 9.93–94. 
52 Their mistreatment of the deposed king, Demaratus, in both cases (6.72.1, 6.84.3). 
53 Cf. the designation of Paris’ abduction of his host’s wife as adikia at 2.113.3, 2.115.3 (cf. 
2.114.2) and the view expressed by the impartial Egyptian king, Proteus, that it deserves tisis 
(2.115.4). 
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a transgression (hamartas, 1.91.1) for which tisis is foretold (1.13.2) and comes 
to pass in the fifth generation, with the downfall of Croesus (1.91.1). That 
Croesus’ downfall is meant to be programmatic for the work as a whole is clear 
from its position and narrative extent, but its paradigmatic status is explicitly 
underlined by Croesus’ conqueror, Cyrus. He applies to his own case Croesus’ 
thoughts on what he had learned from Solon about the mutability of fortune; 
hence, reflecting that he is a human being like Croesus, one whose fortunes, like 
all humans’, are vulnerable to vicissitude, he refrains from putting Croesus to the 
pyre, out of fear of tisis (1.84.6).  
The tisis that corrects human excess and transgression is just one aspect of a 
wider and pervasive pattern that governs the Herodotean universe.54 Thus, when 
the snakes born of the union in which the female kills the male in the act of 
copulation obtain tisis from their mother and timôria for their father by eating 
their way through the mother’s womb (3.109.2) they exemplify the divine 
providence (το  θείου  προνοίη) that keeps species numbers balanced ῦ ἡ
(3.108.1–2). Both in general and in connection with Xerxes’ expedition, events 
and natural disasters confirm, for the historian himself, an equilibrium that is 
both natural and divine (e.g. 7. 137.1–2, 8.129.3, 9.65.2), even if, as he concedes, 
causal connections are sometimes difficult to identify (7.133.2). 
4  Conclusion 
Thus Xerxes’ pursuit of timê without regard for the timê of others violates an 
order which projects Greek social values on to the natural world. This is a world 
permeated by the divine and regulated by the notion that all excess will 
eventually be corrected.55 Central to this natural order is the right of the free 
poleis of Greece to remain free. This independence, in turn, both derives from 
and sustains the freedom, the claim to recognition respect, that the citizens of 
Greek poleis enjoy within their own communities. Herodotus does not believe 
that all human beings or all peoples have such claims; and of course we do not 
share his confidence that either divine norms or norms of nature will correct their 
violation. This is no doubt an excessively optimistic Hellenocentric fantasy. But 
even so it is extremely instructive with regard to Herodotus’ view of the power of 
                                                               
54 Cf. Lateiner 1989, 143–44; contrast Harrison 2000, 116. 
55 As is well known, notions of this sort had already established themselves in the thought of 
Presocratic thinkers such as Anaximander (B 1 Diels-Kranz = Simplicius, Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics 24.14–15, 18–20 Diels): “Anaximander … said that the apeiron is the 
origin of things that exist … But whence things have their coming to be, thither too their 
passing away must occur, according to necessity. For they pay the penalty and tisis to each 
other for their injustice, in accordance with the order of time.” 
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Greek values, their potential for universalization, and the crucial role of an 
inclusive notion of timê as their fundamental core. 
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